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In three empirical studies we examined how people reason about prior convictions
in child abuse cases. We tested whether the disclosure of similar prior convictions
prompts a mental representation or an additive probative value (Criminal Justice
Act, 2003). Asymmetrical use of similar priors were observed in three studies. A
pilot study showed that disclosure of a second prior did not contribute a weight
equivalent to that of the first disclosure. Study 1 showed jurors did not see left-
handed evidence (i.e. matching victim bruising) as more indicative of guilt than
right-handedness unless a prior conviction was present, and the presence of priors
suppressed the generation of alternative possibilities indicative of innocence.
Study 2 showed that disclosure did not decrease community ratings of re-
offending propensity and dangerousness as much as a similar prior conviction
increased them. We consider the results in the context of a new psychological
theory of prior conviction bias and the consequences for the implementation of
Section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003).
Keywords: similar prior convictions; mental representation; additive probative
value; Criminal Justice Act (2003); truth suppression
Introduction
The disclosure of prior convictions, and the manner of this disclosure, is a hotly
contended issue in contemporary law. The UK has made changes to evidence law to
allow the disclosure of a prior conviction when the prior offence resembles present
misconduct (Criminal Justice Act, 2003; Ch. 1, part 11). Criminal cases of child
abuse are one context in which prior conviction use may become apparent (e.g.
Sedlak et al., 2006). Consider the exemplar case of Megan Kanka in the USA who
was killed by a released child offender who, undisclosed to her community, lived
nearby. A public outcry led to emergency legislation. Every child sex offender with a
prior conviction became subject to a mandatory community notification system.
Within several years the remaining 49 states adopted Megan’s Law. This legislation
was intended to protect potential future victims, and to redress a perceived trend of
protecting offenders at the public’s expense (Pawson, 2006).
Changes to evidence law in the UK allowing the disclosure of a similar prior
conviction could be seen to have the same aim (Criminal Justice Act, 2003; Part 11),
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even though the legal psychological literature demonstrates that prior convictions
can bias jurors at the expense of objectivity (e.g. Greene & Dodge, 1995). But the
empirical literature has been inconsistent, sometimes showing prior convictions to
affect guilt verdicts (e.g. Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1972; Hans & Doob, 1976; Kalven
& Zeisel, 1966), and sometimes not (Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; Wissler &
Saks, 1985). This paper aims to investigate if the disclosure of similar prior
convictions in child abuse cases can preserve the delicate balance between securing
prosecutions of defendants who are guilty, and ensure that defendants who have a
similar prior conviction are acquitted. To this end we examine the inconsistencies in
the empirical literature on prior conviction reasoning. We adapt a powerful cognitive
theoretical framework to explain the findings, develop predictions about how the
new inclusion criteria may work in practice, and empirically test whether the
disclosure of similar prior convictions affect objectivity in child abuse cases. Before
turning to the empirical work we outline the legal context for the new admissibility
rules (Criminal Justice Act, 2003).
The legal context
The Criminal Justice Act outlines law governing prior conviction disclosure under
the rubric of bad character evidence (2003, Ch. 1, part 11, sections 98113). Recently,
amendments were made to Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act (1865) and
section 1(3) of the Criminal Evidence Act (1898). Prior conviction disclosure is
allowed when it resembles the present offence (Criminal Justice Act, 2003; Ch. 1, part
11, section 100(3c)). How the criteria need to be met are detailed in Section 100(3),
and the criterion of interest concerns evidence that has probative value ‘by reason of
similarity’ between the conduct of the present offence and other alleged misconduct
(Section 11(3c)(ii)).
Evidence of prior convictions was traditionally excluded because of concerns
about biasing jurors (Keane, 2008). The prosecution were not allowed to use prior
convictions, nor were they to indirectly elicit such evidence in cross-examination.
Should evidence of prior convictions be inadvertently disclosed a jury could be
dismissed.
The recent review of the criminal courts of England and Wales recommended
that criminal evidence law should move away from a clinical use of technical rules of
admissibility1 and move towards trusting lay fact finders. Disclosed evidence of bad
character should only relate to the central set of facts of a case, otherwise it should
not be disclosed2.
Moreover, the court must not admit priors if they are intended to strengthen a
case which is already considered to be weak, and the judge is to direct the jury not to
conclude that a defendant is guilty only on prior conviction evidence. Propensity is
intended to be seen as one factor, and jurors should evaluate it in terms of all the
evidence in the case (Keane, 2008). A prior may demonstrate a propensity, but the
fact of a prior conviction should not be taken to mean that a defendant committed
the offence.
The criteria allow admissibility if a prior has ‘substantive probative value by
similarity’, but there is an ambiguity as to how this new law imagines this probative
value to be processed by jurors. The statement appears to conflate whether a prior
conviction is evidence to be simply added to the evidence set, or added in terms of a
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propensity only. The indicated additive process does not discriminate a mental
process of adding the weight of the prior independently to the evidence set from
the process of adding the prior to each piece of evidence. It is possible that the prior
has the saliency to prompt jurors to think of how the defendant is guilty, and of how
evidence confirms guilt rather than innocence. Thus can we trust lay fact finders,
such as jurors to use this evidence as intended, even in difficult circumstances such as
child protection cases?
To evaluate this proposition this paper conducts a detailed and precise empirical
examination of the mental processes prompted by disclosure of similar prior
convictions in child abuse cases. A contemporary and powerful cognitive theory of
human reasoning, the Mental Model Theory (Johnson-Laird, 2006), will be drawn
upon to theoretically illuminate why inconsistencies occurred in the past literature,
and to generate predictions for the empirical work reported here. We next outline the
empirical inconsistencies in the prior conviction literature, and then present the
cognitive theoretical framework in an accessible format for psychologists, criminol-
ogists and lawyers alike.
Prior conviction bias
The first study investigating how prior convictions affect juror verdicts examined the
discourses of real cases, and found that guilty verdicts were returned more often
(about 27% more often), especially when the other evidence was ambiguous and did
not clearly indicate a defendant’s guilt (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966).
The introduction of limiting instructions was the first effort to reduce prior
conviction bias but they have not generally prevented the diffusion of the biasing effects
of disclosure to guilty verdicts (Greene & Dodge, 1995; Bottoms & Goodman, 1994).
For example, when judge’s limiting instructions were given directing mock jurors to use
the prior conviction to assess credibility but not guilt, tape recordings of jurors’
deliberations showed that they spent an equivalent amount of time discussing the
defendant’s credibility whether a prior conviction was disclosed or not (Doob &
Kirschenbaum, 1972).
Likewise research examining how the group process limits prior conviction bias
has shown that groups sometimes alleviate the effects of the prior conviction and
sometimes not. Groups reasoned towards guilt verdicts more often following
disclosure, either individually or in groups of four people (Doob & Kirschenbaum,
1972). But studies examining the effects of inadmissible evidence more generally, of
which prior conviction disclosure would be a subset, have shown that jurors reached a
guilty verdict more often before they deliberated with a group of jurors (Carretta &
Moreland, 1983). Moreover, in child abuse mock trials, in which a defendant was
accused of assaulting an 8-year-old child, jurors reached more guilty verdicts pre-
deliberation than post-deliberation, when the prior conviction was disclosed but
deemed inadmissible. Perhaps the group of jurors may remind one another not to use
the prior conviction inappropriately by communicating more alternative possibilities
about what has happened, than a juror operating from their individual perspective,
thus decreasing the impact of a prior conviction (McCoy, Nunez, & Dammeyer, 1999).
But discourse analysis has shown that groups of jurors do refer to the prior
conviction in relation to guilt, ruling out deliberation as a universal possible means
to avert the diffusion of prior conviction to verdicts (Hans & Doob, 1976). Jurors
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may pay greater attention to evidence once it has been ruled inadmissible to remind
them not to use it, but this attention may inadvertently lead to the evidence having a
greater saliency in how they represent it in their mind, which in fact increases its
impact on guilt ratings (Cox & Tanford, 1989; Pickel, 1995).
But are all prior convictions equal, or does the similarity of the prior conviction
count? Wissler and Saks (1985) examined how similar and dissimilar prior
convictions affected guilt verdicts. Jurors convicted less often in murder trials
when a dissimilar prior conviction, such as autotheft was disclosed (35% of the time),
than when no prior conviction was disclosed (50%), or when a similar prior for
murder was disclosed (70%). But a dissimilar prior conviction of murder did not
suppress guilt verdicts in an autotheft trial (70%). Properties of the prior conviction’s
dissimilarity may suppress verdicts of guilt when they are admissible, but only when
the prior conviction is dissimilar and for a lesser offence (Wissler & Saks, 1985). It is
possible that jurors may think that prosecutors are trying to unfairly prejudice them
against the defendant as raising suspicion about the underlying motive behind prior
conviction disclosure has been shown to help reduce its effect on guilty verdicts when
it is inadmissible (Fein et al., 1997).
The Criminal Justice Act (2003) allows the admission of similar prior convic-
tions, but the literature shows that in some circumstances jurors can control the
influence of prior convictions and sometimes they cannot. To evaluate the new
provisions this paper draws together the threads of these empirical inconsistencies
and applies a cognitive theory to explain how the inclusion criteria may affect juror
reasoning across dissimilar evidence contexts.
Asymmetries in prior conviction bias: lenses of evidence
The Mental Model Theory predicts that people reason about evidence by representing
models in mind corresponding to possible states of affair in the world (Johnson-Laird,
2006). When prior conviction evidence is disclosed it may prompt a mental
representation reflective of guilt, which may sometimes act as a lens by which other
evidence is evaluated. In other words a mental model representing guilt may prompt a
line of thinking in which all other evidence is interpreted only in terms of how it
confirms a guilty verdict; evidence that confirms guilt may be attended to more so and
more deeply than evidence that disconfirms guilt. Critically the application of a mental
model theory to prior conviction reasoning predicts that some sorts of evidence in the
criminal justice system, in this case prior convictions, are more likely to prompt
consideration of a guilt representation than a probative value indicative of guilt. This
mental representation of guilt not only primes the readiness with which corroborative
evidence is considered, even if it is weak evidence, but it suppresses the generation of
alternative possible explanations indicative of innocence, and the necessary con-
sideration of disconfirming evidence when present. Whereas a guilt value presupposes
that alternative thoughts of guilt and innocence are simultaneously accessible on a
continuum to the juror mind, a guilt representation may in fact suppress considera-
tions of alternative evidence possibilities indicative of innocence.
Mental representations are generated according to a small set of principles that
govern human reasoning more generally (Johnson-Laird, 2006). One principle is the
principle of truth. The theory predicts that jurors represent the possibility that they
think to be true, and when a similar prior is disclosed (pc), they may think the
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possibility that the defendant is guilty (g) to be true (If pc, then g). This inference,
known as the Modus Ponens (MP) inference in propositional logic, contains an
antecedent corresponding to the prior (pc), and a consequent that corresponds to
guilt (g). There are three other inferences including: Modus Tollens (MT), for which
the antecedent corresponds to the consequent when there is neither a prior (pc) nor
guilt (g)3; the Affirmation of the Consequent (AC), for which the consequent does
not correspond to the antecedent in which there is guilt (g) in the absence of a prior
(pc); and the Denial of the Antecedent (DA), for which the antecedent in which
there is a prior (pc) does not correspond to the consequent of not guilt (g). In
accordance with the principle of truth, people find it more difficult to represent the
possibilities they consider to be false and which contain negation (). When prior
convictions are to be used to inform defendant propensity rather than guilt, the
Denial of the Antecedent (DA) inference, that a defendant is not guilty if they have a
prior conviction, is required for consideration (If pc, then g). But extensive
empirical work on human deduction has shown that people tend to find this
inference one of the most difficult of the four deductive inferences to infer in
propositional logic, while the Modus Ponens (MP) inference that a defendant is
guilty given a prior conviction (If pc, then g) is the easiest to infer (Johnson-Laird,
2006; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).
We conceptualize initial prior conviction reasoning by reference to how these
inferences are prompted by prior conviction evidence. This paper differs from past
studies in one respect, participants are not presented with laboratory premises from
which they should then reason (e.g. If I then ^ . . . If there is a square, then there is a
triangle. There is a square. What if anything follows . . .). The premises from which we
expect jurors to reason are prompted from their own knowledge about people who have
prior convictions. In effect we are making predictions about what premises are prompted.
We predict that people may think about further evidence possibilities corresponding to
how consistent the evidence is with this mental representation of guilt (MP), because they
tend not to think of how a prior conviction corresponds to innocence (DA).
The principle of consistency predicts that evidence that is consistent with the
possibility that the juror currently represents, will be interpreted in light of this
possibility. Thus if a juror represents the defendant as guilty given the prior conviction,
then evidence that corroborates guilt, or can be ambiguously interpreted as corroborat-
ing guilt, will be considered more readily, and considered to be more important than
evidence not indicative of guilt. Inconsistent refuting evidence implying negation (i.e.
‘not’ guilty), has been found difficult in reasoning more generally (e.g. Cowley & Byrne,
2005; Legrenzi, Girotto, & Johnson-Laird, 2003; Wason, 1960).
Taken together the principles of truth and consistency suggest that people will
find it difficult to represent the possibility of innocence when a prior is disclosed
(DA), and they will find it difficult to represent the two alternative possibilities of
guilt and innocence simultaneously (If pc, then g & If pc, theng). Not only because
one represents what they reason to be true and the other what they reason to be false,
but because the principle of parsimony predicts that jurors will explicitly represent the
least number of possibilities to conserve their reasoning resources (Baddeley, 2007;
Johnson-Laird, 2006). Thus jurors may focus on the first possibility that is consistent
with the evidence they have already heard, namely a prior conviction and its
correspondence with guilt (MP), and attend to subsequent confirming evidence
more readily.
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In short, we predict that jurors evaluate evidence according to the possibility that
they consider to be true, and represent most saliently in their mind. The possibility of
guilt or innocence will then act as a lens by which each piece of evidence is evaluated.
For accessible interdisciplinary purposes, we outline the main predictions about how
jurors may reason about priors in accordance with the criteria in Table 1, and we
refer to these predictions throughout the results and discussion.
Next we turn to the studies to examine: how priors impact upon guilt ratings, if
they lead jurors to consider the prior’s contribution independently of other evidence,
and if their disclosure can be counterbalanced by an explicit reference to a history of
‘no prior convictions’.
Pilot study
This pilot study aimed to test prior conviction pilot questions in criminal cases of
child abuse. We tested for the impact of priors on guilty verdicts when one and two
similar priors for child abuse was disclosed. We examined if we could rule out a
ceiling effect for guilty verdicts should a prior conviction for a similar offence be
disclosed for this sensitive issue.
Method
Participants
Fifty-four people took part. There were eight men and 46 women. Their mean age
was 20.5 years and their ages ranged from 19 to 33 years. They took part on a
voluntary basis and were recruited from the University of Southampton campus.
Table 1. Key predictions of the lenses of evidence framework.
Prediction
1
One prior conviction will prompt a mental representation of guilt (MP: If pc,
then g). Two prior convictions will not prompt two guilt representations; one
suffices (principle of parsimony). Nor will a second add the same amount of
weight as the first; prior convictions prompt mental representations more so than
additive weight (i.e. a mental model).
Prediction
2
Evidence consistent with a mental model of guilt will be deemed more significant
in the presence of a prior conviction than in the absence of one (principle of
consistency).
Prediction
3
The representation of a model of guilt suppresses the generation of alternatives
(principle of parsimony) indicative of innocence (DA: If pc, theng). Thus
counterevidence is more difficult to process in the absence of alternative
possibilities (principle of truth).
Prediction
4
Prior convictions prompt mental models of guilt, which in turn prompt auxiliary
stereotypical assumptions consistent with a criminal representation, including
perceptions of increased dangerousness and the propensity to re-offend (principle
of consistency).
Prediction
5
‘No prior convictions’ will not prompt a mental model of non-guilt in the same
way as a prior conviction prompts a mental model of guilt. The negative form no
will be more difficult to process than the positive opposite ‘a prior conviction’
(principle of truth).
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Materials
A short scenario was adapted from a real-life case of an 18-month-old girl who was
killed by a man with two similar prior convictions. Identities were protected by
changing names. The consent and debriefing underwent meticulous ethical review-
ing. The sensitivity of the study was flagged in the initial person-to-person
description and on the consent form. Options to withdraw were clearly stated.
The debriefing contained hand-out information with contact details of the principal
investigator and relevant organizations. Participants were asked to consider the
following scenario:
On January 2nd 2006, David Baxter had been arrested. He had been accused of killing
eighteen month old Joanna Connolly. Joanna’s skull had been fractured when she
received a physical blow to the head. Joanna was the daughter of Susan Connolly, the
woman David Baxter had been seeing.
Design and procedure
A 31 between-subjects design was used. We simply examined the effects of
considering prior convictions as evidence. The three conditions included: a control
condition in which no evidence of prior convictions was given to participants and
two experimental conditions in which evidence of one prior conviction was given in
the first and evidence of two prior convictions was given in the second.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and they first read the above
scenario. In the experimental conditions participants were given evidence of prior
convictions in the following format (in the control condition they did not receive this
sentence and in the experimental condition with two prior convictions they received
an identical crime with an earlier date): ‘David Baxter had previously served a three
year sentence for being physically abusive towards an ex-girlfriend’s three year old in
2002’.
Participants then answered two questions and were given an option of recording
their reasons for choice for each. The first question required a categorical response of
either ‘guilty’ ‘not guilty’ or ‘cannot decide’. The second question required a rating
response on a Likert scale of 010 (where 0 represented ‘not guilty’ and 10
represented ‘guilty’).
Reasons for choice responses were coded qualitatively (Appendix I) and
subjected to non-parametric tests. They were transcribed and segmented into
individual components mentioning evidence (see Appendix I). The number of each
sort of evidence statement was calculated per participant.
The evidence statements corresponded to respondents’ thinking about the
possibilities of guilt and innocence including: positive (‘ . . .[the prior] indicates he
could be guilty’), negative (‘ . . .[the prior] is not sufficient’) and neutral (‘this is a
neutral choice for me’). A counterevidence category enabled the inclusion of negative
evidence statements related to evidence other than the prior conviction such as
reasoning about evidence of intent (e.g. ‘there is no intent to kill Joanna’), and
alternative possible explanations representing innocence (e.g. ‘Joanna could have
fallen awkwardly by herself ’). A category was created to examine the use of
alternative possibilities that were either explicit (‘any left-handed person could have
killed Joanna’) or not explicit (‘either guilty or not’)4.
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Results
Participants chose ‘cannot decide’ (89%) significantly more often than ‘guilty’ (9%)
or ‘not guilty’ (2%) regardless of how many prior convictions were considered (x2
75.44(2), pB0.0005). In the absence of other evidence, jurors do not systematically
choose ‘guilty’ verdicts for defendants accused of child abuse, even if two similar
priors are disclosed. The priors instead impacted the underlying mean rating of guilt
which was higher when a prior conviction was present (mean rank5.86 and mean
rank6.33, for one and two prior convictions, respectively), than when absent
(mean rank3.35, KruskalWallis x216.162(2), pB0.0005).
The second disclosure did not affect underlying ratings of guilt to the same
degree as the first. The result suggests that a prior conviction could be sufficient to
prompt a juror to think of the possibility that the defendant is guilty, and that this
possibility could be taking form as a mental representation rather than a value of
guilt. This result highlights the difficulty with an assumption that each prior
conviction adds a uniform weight, as imagined by the idea of additional probative
weight to add to an evidence set (Criminal Justice Act, 2003).
Reasons for choice
Overall, 141 evidence statements were generated. The number of evidence statements
were similar when no prior (34%) one prior (28%) and two priors were disclosed
(38%, x217.526(12), p0.05). Unexpectedly more evidence statements referred to
negative evidence (71%, i.e. how evidence does not support a guilty verdict), than
positive (25%, i.e. how evidence does support a guilty verdict) or neutral evidence
(4%, x240.145(5), pB0.0005). But this negative evidence somewhat tended to be
generated when no prior conviction was disclosed (46%) than when one (23%) or two
prior convictions (31%) were disclosed (x218.026(12), p0.057). Jurors tended to
see prior convictions as evidence corroborating guilt; they generated more positive
evidence statements when two prior convictions were disclosed (52%), than when one
(34%) or no prior convictions were disclosed (14%, x212.284(6), pB0.05), as the
principle of consistency predicted.
Overall, 30 alternatives indicative of innocence were generated. More non-
explicit alternative possibilities (67%) were generated than explicit alternative
possibilities (33%, binomial, pB0.05), corroborating the prediction that jurors
find it generally difficult to generate alternative possibilities, and to make them
explicit, in opposition to the mental representation they hold to be true (i.e. that the
defendant is guilty). Overall alternative possibilities were not significantly generated
less often when one prior conviction (17%) and when two prior convictions (23%)
were disclosed, than when no prior convictions were disclosed (60%, x29.410(6),
p0.076)5.
The pilot study indicated that prior conviction disclosure affected how jurors
mentally represent a defendant’s guilt. Underlying ratings of guilt verdicts showed
that prior conviction disclosure affected how guilty jurors thought a defendant
was, but in the absence of additional evidence prior convictions tended not to
lead to ‘guilty’ verdicts. Next we examine what happens when further evidence is
introduced.
218 M. Cowley and J.B. Colyer
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
Ox
fo
rd
] 
At
: 
09
:1
5 
8 
Ju
ne
 2
01
0
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2339476 
Study 1
This study investigates how the disclosure of prior conviction evidence affects how
jurors think about other evidence relevant to a case.
Method
Participants
Seventy-two people took part. There were 24 men and 48 women. Their mean age
was 22.4 years and their ages ranged from 18 to 53. Participants were given the
choice of accepting £4 for taking part, and they were recruited from the University of
Southampton campus and the general public.
Materials
The Joanna Connolly scenario and the information about David Baxter’s prior
conviction from Study 1 were used in this study. The debriefing again contained
hand-out information with contact details of the principal investigator and relevant
organizations.
Design and procedure
A 32 between-subjects condition was employed. The first between-subjects
variable was presence of a prior conviction (evidence of one prior conviction or no
prior conviction). The second between-subjects variable was forensic evidence related
to handedness of the defendant (evidence that the defendant was right-handed, or
left-handed, or no evidence of handedness). Prior conviction and handedness
evidence was counterbalanced to rule out ordering effects.
Handedness presents a reasonably objective measure to compare people’s
weighted contribution towards guilt (left-handedness occurs in approximately 10%
of the population and right-handedness occurs in approximately 90% of the
population). Twelve people were assigned to each condition to aid potential
comparisons with a jury. In the forensic conditions people were given a sentence
related to handedness in one of the following formats: ‘Forensic evidence showed
that the blow was delivered by a left-handed person. David Baxter is left-handed’, or
‘Forensic evidence showed that the blow was delivered by a right-handed person.
David Baxter is right-handed’. Participants answered the same categorical, Likert
scale, and reason for choice questions as in the pilot study.
Results and discussion
Participants returned the verdict ‘cannot decide’ (78%) significantly more often than
‘guilty’ (16%) or ‘not guilty’ (6%, x265.333(2), pB0.0005), as Figure 1 shows. The
pattern of verdicts tended towards guilty (75%) when prior convictions were present
than when absent (25%, x25.143(2), pB0.05). Figure 1 shows the number of
people who chose each sort of verdict per juror condition (n12) (control, control;
RH, right-handed evidence only; LH, left-handed evidence only; PC, prior
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conviction evidence only; PCRH, prior conviction and right-handed evidence;
PCLH, prior conviction and left-handed evidence).
Jurors chose ‘cannot decide’ significantly more often than ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’
in every case except when they consider evidence of a prior conviction and left-
handedness, as Figure 2 shows. When jurors were presented with no evidence in the
control condition they chose ‘cannot decide’ (84%) more often than ‘guilty’ (8%) or
‘not guilty’ (8%, x213.5(2), pB0.001). When jurors consider evidence of right-
handedness or left-handedness, in the absence of a prior conviction, they endorse
‘cannot decide’ more often than ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ to the same degree (92%
‘cannot decide’ and 8% ‘guilty’, respectively) (x28.33(1), pB0.005). In the absence
of a prior, left-handedness and right-handedness led to symmetric guilt verdicts even
though left-handedness is better evidence of guilt than right-handedness.
When there is only prior conviction evidence ‘cannot decide’ (67%) is chosen
significantly more often than ‘guilty’ (25%) and ‘not guilty’ (8%, x26.5(2), pB
0.05). When one prior conviction and right-handedness are considered ‘cannot
decide’ (75%) is endorsed significantly more often than ‘guilty’ (8%) and not guilty
(17%, x29.5(2), pB0.01). But when jurors consider one prior conviction and left-
handedness, they begin to endorse ‘guilty’ (42%) almost as often as ‘cannot decide’
(58%), and they tend to ignore the ‘not guilty’ conclusion (0%, x20.333(1),
0
2
4
6
8
10
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Control RH LH PC PCRH PCLH
Guilty
Not guilty
Cannot decide
Figure 1. The number of jurors from a jury (n12) who chose ‘guilty’, ‘not guilty’, or
‘cannot decide’. RH, right-handed evidence only; LH, left-handed evidence only; PC, prior
conviction evidence only; PCRH, prior conviction and right-handed evidence; PCLH, prior
conviction and left-handed evidence with encapsulated emphasis.
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Figure 2. The proportion of alternative possibilities indicative of innocence generated in the
absence and presence of a similar prior conviction. RH, right-handed evidence only; LH, left-
handed evidence only; PC, prior conviction evidence only; PCRH, prior conviction and right-
handed evidence; PCLH, prior conviction and left-handed evidence.
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p0.05). This result suggests that additional confirming evidence, in this case left-
handedness, is asymmetrically weighted as heavier when prior conviction evidence is
present, than when it is absent. Moreover, left-handedness and right-handedness do
not lead to symmetric patterns of guilt once a prior conviction is present. The
addition of right-handedness to a prior conviction led to a slight increase in ‘not
guilty’ verdicts. Thus the prior may prompt a mental representation of guilt more
readily leading to the processing of corroborative evidence, even if the left-handed
evidence does not directly lead to guilt.
Jurors’ mean underlying ratings of guilt were higher when a prior conviction was
present (mean rank43.83) than not (mean rank29.17, MannWhitney
U384(36,36), pB0.005). Mean underlying ratings of guilt were lowest when no
evidence was given (mean rank14.33), and somewhat higher when right-handed-
ness evidence was present (mean rank20.42) and when left-handedness evidence
was present (mean rank20.75), but not significantly so (KruskalWallis
x23.002(2), p 0.05). Mean underlying ratings of guilt did not differ significantly
from one another when a prior conviction was present without handedness evidence
(mean rank19.92), with right-handedness (mean rank16.46) and with left-
handedness evidence (mean rank19.12, KruskalWallis x20.743(2), p0.05).
Thus similar prior convictions may not clearly add a quantifiable value that can be
generalized across dissimilar evidence sets.
Reasons for choice
A total of 220 evidence statements were generated. The number of evidence
statements did not differ from one another significantly across the six conditions
(control: 11%, LH: 16%, RH: 14%, PC: 20%, PCLH: 19%, PCRH: 20%,
x227.957(25), p0.05). More negative evidence statements were generated
(61%) than positive (36%) or neutral ones (3%, x222.347(5), pB0.0005). More
positive evidence statements tended to be generated when a similar prior was
disclosed (27.5%), and right-handedness (19%) and left-handedness were also
disclosed (24%), than when no evidence (6%), or right-handedness (11%) and left-
handedness alone were disclosed (12.5%, x233.708(20), pB0.02).
A similar number of negative evidence statements were generated when there was
no evidence (12%), when there was evidence of left-handedness (18%) or right-
handedness only (16%), and also when there was a prior conviction (16%) with right-
handedness (21%) or left-handedness (17%, x221.497(25), p0.05).
The number of counterevidence statements (including statements referring to
intent and alternative possibilities indicating that the defendant is not guilty) did not
differ when there was no evidence (15%), evidence of left-handedness (20%) or right-
handedness (17%), and when there was a prior conviction (13%) with left-handedness
(16%) or right-handedness (19%, x225.583(30), p0.05).
Overall 43 alternatives indicative of innocence were generated. More were
generated when no similar prior conviction was disclosed, that is, when there was no
evidence (25%), when there was evidence of left-handedness (23%) and when there
was evidence of right-handedness (21%), compared to when a similar prior
conviction was disclosed (7%), with left-handedness (12%) or with right-handedness
(12%, x224.385(15), pB0.05), as Figure 2 shows.
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Overall alternatives indicative of innocence were suppressed when a prior
conviction was disclosed (30%) than not (70%, n43, binomial pB0.02). Overall
less explicit alternative possibilities were generated when a prior conviction was
disclosed (26%) than not (74%, n23, binomial pB0.05). Overall less non-explicit
alternative possibilities were generated when a prior conviction was disclosed (35%)
than not (65%), but not significantly so (n20, binomial p0.05). The results
corroborate the prediction that the guilt representation prompted by prior
conviction disclosure suppresses the generation of alternative possibilities indicative
of innocence.
Study 2
This study intended to investigate if information about the presence or absence of
prior convictions could be extended to understand their impact on attitudes in a
future potential community. We tested how disclosing information to a community
about an offender who had been released from prison for a child abuse conviction,
and who also had a further similar prior conviction, would be received compared to
an offender being released who had an explicitly negated prior conviction (‘no
similar prior conviction’).
Method
Participants
Forty-eight (15 men and 33 women) took part. Their mean age was 34 years and
their ages ranged from 19 to 86 years. Their participation was voluntary and they
were recruited from the public and the University of Southampton campus.
Design and procedure
A questionnaire format booklet was assigned to respondents in one of three
conditions. They were randomly presented with one of three envelopes at the mid-
point of the questionnaire. The first read a short scenario which was created based
on a real-life case6: ‘A man who is a convicted paedophile has made positive progress
in prison. He has completed a strict, structured rehabilitation programme which
focuses on the prevention of re-offending’.
Then each respondent completed the first half of the questionnaire which asked:
‘Do you think that this man will re-offend?’; ‘Do you think that this man will pose a
danger to the community?’ and ‘Do you think it is important to be informed if this
man was to be located to your community?’, and they responded to each question as
both a categorically (i.e. yes/no/cannot decide) and on a Likert scale (where
0 represented strongly disagree and 10 represented strongly agree).
Then they received one of three envelopes. In the control group they were simply
told that the man was about to be released. The first experimental group was
informed that the man for release had ‘one similar prior conviction’ and the second
group was informed that the man for release had ‘no similar prior conviction’.
Respondents then answered the same questions as before once they received the
new piece of evidence. They were not allowed to change their responses for the first
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half of the questionnaire. Two further questions asked whether they thought the
additional evidence was beneficial, and if they thought their attitude towards
the offender had changed given the additional evidence. The questions were asked in
the same categorical and Likert scale format as previous questions.
Results and discussion
We carried out within-subject comparisons to precisely identify the impact of
disclosure on the initial attitude specific to when told the offender had one prior, no
prior, or was simply about to be released7.
Disclosure of ‘one similar prior conviction’
Regarding re-offending, the response ‘cannot decide’ (75%) was endorsed signifi-
cantly more often than the response ‘yes’ (19%) or ‘no’ (6%, x212.875(2),
pB0.005), before the disclosure of one prior. After disclosure respondents now
significantly endorsed the response ‘yes’ (81%) more often than ‘no’ (6%) or ‘cannot
decide’ (13%, x216.625(2), pB0.0005). Ratings of how much respondents thought
the man likely to re-offend were higher when the prior conviction was disclosed
(M6.81) than before (M5.19, Wilcoxon’s Z2.461, n16, n16, pB0.05).
Regarding dangerousness, the response ‘cannot decide’ (62%) was endorsed
significantly more often than the response ‘yes’ (38%) or ‘no’ (0%, x21.000(2),
pB0.05), before disclosure. After disclosure respondents now significantly endorsed
the response ‘yes’ (81%) more often than the response ‘cannot decide’ (19%) or ‘no’
(0%, x26.250(2), pB0.05). Ratings of how dangerous they thought the man would
be for the community was higher after disclosure (M7.31) than before (M5.25,
Wilcoxon’s Z3.443, n16, n16, pB0.005).
Regarding identity disclosure, the response ‘yes’ (56%) was endorsed more often
than ‘no’ (19%) and ‘cannot decide’ (25%) before disclosure, but this pattern was not
significant (x23.875(2), p0.05). After disclosure respondents now significantly
endorsed the response ‘yes’ (62%) more than no (19%) and ‘cannot decide’ (19%,
x26.125(2), pB0.05). Ratings of whether they thought the man’s identity should
be revealed to them was the same after disclosure (M6.63) than before (M6.63,
Wilcoxon’s Z2.818, n16, n16, pB0.005). The results show that prior
conviction disclosure increases negative attitudes towards offender dangerousness
and re-offending upon release.
Disclosure of ‘no similar prior conviction’
Regarding re-offending, the group designated to receive the envelope with ‘no similar
prior conviction’ chose the response ‘cannot decide’ (50%) as often as ‘yes’ (44%) and
‘no’ (6%, x25.375(2), p0.05), before disclosure. After the disclosure of evidence
about ‘no similar prior conviction’, respondents endorsed the response ‘cannot
decide’ (56%) significantly more often than ‘yes’ (38%) or ‘no’ (6%, x26.125(2),
pB0.05). Ratings of whether they thought the man would re-offend were slightly, but
not significantly less, after the disclosure (M6.00) than before (M6.19,
Wilcoxon’s Z0.378, n16, n16, p0.05).
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Regarding dangerousness, the response ‘yes’ (56%) was endorsed significantly
more often than ‘no’ (6%) or ‘cannot decide’ (38%, x26.125(2), pB0.05) before
disclosure. Respondents tended to think the man not to pose as much of a danger
after the disclosure ‘no similar prior conviction’ with half choosing ‘cannot decide’
(50%) and ‘yes’ (44%) compared to ‘no’ (6%, x25.375(2), p0.05). Ratings of
dangerousness did not differ after disclosure (M6.00) from before (M6.63,
Wilcoxon’s Z1.710, n16, n16, p0.05).
Regarding identity disclosure, they chose ‘cannot decide’ (38%) as often ‘no’
(31%) or ‘yes’ (31%, x20.125(2), p0.05) before disclosure. After disclosure they
chose ‘yes’ (38%) as often as ‘no’ (31%) or cannot decide (31%, x20.125, p0.05).
The result that the majority of respondents (62%) did not deem it necessary to reveal
an offender’s identity in light of no similar prior convictions was unexpected given
that the offender had been in prison for sexually offending against a child. Ratings of
identity disclosure did not differ after disclosure (M4.56) than before (M5.56,
Wilcoxon’s Z2.818, n16, n16, p0.05).
There is an asymmetry in the impact that an explicit positive instance and an
explicit negative instance has; explicit positive instances more readily affect thoughts
of dangerousness and re-offending than explicit negative instances, as Figure 3
shows.
Control group
There were no changes in the control group before and after envelope disclosure.
‘Yes’ (56%) was endorsed more often than ‘no’ (13%) and ‘cannot decide’ (31%,
x24.625(2), p0.05). After disclosure, ‘yes’ (50%) remained the most frequent
endorsed response (6% ‘no’ and 44% ‘cannot decide’, x25.375(2), p0.05). Scale
responses did not differ either (Wilcoxon’s Z0.677, n16, p0.05).
Regarding dangerousness, ‘yes’ (75%) was endorsed more often than the
responses of ‘no’ (6%) and ‘cannot decide’ (19%) (x212.875(2), pB0.005), and
this result was replicated when told of impending release. Difference between
response ratings were also equivalent (M7.31 vs 7.06, Wilcoxon’s Z0.791,
n16, n16, p0.05).
Regarding identify disclosure, ‘yes’ (56%) was endorsed more often than ‘no’
(25%) and ‘cannot decide’ (19%), and this pattern was not significant (x23.875(2),
p0.05). After disclosure the response ‘yes’ (62%) was also chosen more often than
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Figure 3. How likely the offender is thought to re-offend and pose a danger to the
community.
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‘no’ (25%) or ‘cannot decide’ (13%), and this pattern was marginally significant
(x26.5(2), pB0.05). Scale responses did not differ regarding disclosure (Wilcoxon’s
Z1.732, n16, p0.05).
Thoughts on how beneficial it would be to disclose
Respondents thought that information about ‘one similar prior conviction’ was
beneficial (69%) more than not (12%) or cannot decide (19%, x29.125(2), pB0.01).
But they were unable to decide if ‘no similar prior conviction’ was beneficial (38%) or
not (31%), or they could not decide (31%, x20.125(2), p0.05). There was no
change in the control group who thought disclosure as beneficial (50%) as often as
they could not decide (50%, x23.5(2), p0.05). Those who received evidence of a
similar prior conviction thought it somewhat more beneficial (M7.63) than those
who received no evidence (M6.00) or ‘no similar prior conviction’ (M5.38), but
this trend was not significant (KruskalWallis x23.914(2), p0.05).
Respondents’ own estimation of the impact of prior conviction disclosure
Respondents (63%) estimated that a similar prior conviction changed their responses
but many could not decide or thought it had no effect (37%, x21.000(1), p0.05).
Respondents could not decide if no similar prior conviction changed their
response; many chose ‘cannot decide’ and ‘no’ (94%) significantly more than ‘yes’
(6%, x212.250(1), pB0.005). The control group tended to chose ‘cannot decide’
plus ‘no’ (75%) significantly more often than yes (25%, x24.000(1), pB0.05).
Overall disclosure of a similar prior conviction was held to affect responses
significantly more (M5.13) than disclosure of no similar prior conviction
(M1.63) or non-disclosure of any prior conviction evidence (M0.13, Kruskal
Wallis x224.138(2), pB0.0005). Thus respondents were aware of how similar prior
convictions and no similar prior convictions affected their reasoning. We now turn to
a discussion of the results.
Discussion
The results highlight asymmetric use of similar prior convictions. These asymmetries
may present difficulties for the implementation of the new law provisions for similar
priors in the way that they are presently intended (Criminal Justice Act, 2003).
Similar priors were not found to contribute equivalent probative force across
dissimilar evidence sets, in each of the reported studies. One psychological
explanation for these asymmetries is that similar priors may prompt jurors to
generate a mental representation of guilt (If pc, then g) rather than not guilty (If pc,
then g), and that this thought of guiltiness takes form as a mental model rather
than an independent probative value (Johnson-Laird, 2006).
The pilot showed that a second child abuse prior did not affect jurors’ mean
underlying ratings of guilt equivalently to the first. According to the principle of
truth a prior may prompt an explicit model indicative of guilt, to which a second
similar prior adds little. If priors prompt jurors to represent models rather than
evidence values, then one model is cognitively sufficient, in accordance with the
principle of parsimony (see also Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Moreover, if
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the juror represents a model of guilt then this model will suppress the generation of
contradictory alternative models indicative of the opposite, namely the defendant’s
innocence (see also Byrne, 1989), and the pilot showed that less explicit than non-
explicit alternatives indicative of innocence were generated when a similar prior was
disclosed.
Study 1 found that when inconclusive evidence additional to the prior, in this case
when a left-handedness match between the defendant’s handedness and victim
bruising, was present almost half of a group of 12 potential jurors chose the ‘guilty’
verdict. A left-handed match presents weak evidence of guilt given the 10% incidence
rate in the general population (McManus, 2002), but the prior adds significant
strength to this already weak case (see also Greene & Dodge, 1995).
But not just any weak evidence will do. Evidence of a right-handed match in
addition to a prior did not lead to more guilt verdicts than when a prior was absent.
Indeed a small but insignificant increase was observed in ‘not guilty’ verdicts when
there was both a similar prior and a right-handedness match compared to when there
was evidence of right-handedness only. The notion that a prior could, in some
circumstances, reduce guilt verdicts is not new given the finding that priors for auto-
theft can decrease guilt verdicts for murder charges (Wissler & Saks, 1985). But such
findings do highlight the difficulties with assuming that similar priors contribute
‘additive’ probative value.
The asymmetric pattern of guilt verdicts for left- and right-handedness matches
only occurred when there was a prior conviction. The pattern of verdicts was
symmetrically distributed across verdicts for right-handedness and left-handedness
in the absence of a prior (even though left-handedness is a better indicator of guilt
than right-handedness). This result suggests that the disclosure of a similar prior
conviction can prompt a model which can act as a lens affecting how other evidence
is processed in relation to guilt (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2006; pace Oaksford & Chater,
2007). The prior need not be presented first to have this effect, given that we
counterbalanced presentation order of priors and handedness.
Less alternatives indicative of innocence were generated in the reasons for choice
responses when a prior was present than when absent, corroborating the prediction
that priors prompt models of guilt which suppress the innocent alternative. The
arbitrariness of the right-handed match may in fact prompt jurors to consider
alternatives indicating how a defendant may be innocent, and representing explicit
models indicative of innocence could somewhat suppress the effects of a similar
prior.
Study 2 investigated if an explicit statement about an offender, who was about to
be released into the community, having ‘no similar prior convictions’, would
suppress primed thoughts about the offender’s dangerousness and re-offending, to
the same extent as the disclosure of a similar prior conviction prompts such
thoughts. In accordance with the principle of truth the results showed that the prior
asymmetrically increased ratings of dangerousness and thoughts of re-offending, but
more so than the introduction of an explicit statement about ‘no similar prior’
decreased them. The offender who is about to be released already has one prior,
given that he is about to be released from prison, so in effect having ‘no similar
priors’ previous to this offence may be a less convincing negation than an acquittal.
And having a defendant accused of child abuse and explicitly stating that they have
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‘no similar priors’ during their first trial might have a different effect than when they
have already been found guilty.
However, each of the three studies provided results supportive of jurors’ ability to
reason cautiously about priors even if they were subsequently found not to follow
through on their initial cautious thinking. The pilot showed that jurors’ were
reluctant to return guilt verdicts when prior conviction evidence was not corrobo-
rated by evidence relevant to the present case; they tended to choose ‘cannot decide’
even when there were two similar child abuse priors (pace Meloy, 2005; West, 2000).
Study 1 showed that even though jurors arrived at guilt verdicts more readily
when reasoning about a prior and left-handedness, and their thoughts of alternatives
indicative of guilt were suppressed in the presence of a prior, they generated more
negative than positive or neutral evidence statements, and the proportion of negative
statements did not differ across prior and no prior conditions. If the prior prompted
the representation of a model of guilt, then these negative statements would not be
easily accommodated unless explicit alternatives indicative of innocence are already
being considered (Cowley, 2006; Cowley & Byrne, in press; Wason & Johnson-Laird,
1972). The pilot study and Study 1 showed that where alternatives were generated, it
was the alternatives explicitly indicative of innocence that were suppressed by priors.
That they think of how the evidence may not indicate guilt, and then not use it to
return ‘not guilty’ verdicts indicates a caution of reasoning. But jurors also generate
more positive evidence statements consistent with a mental representation of guilt
when a similar prior is disclosed, and this consistent evidence may be more readily
processed in accordance with the principle of consistency (see also Darley & Gross,
1983; Legrenzi et al., 2003).
Study 2 provided some evidence for the conjecture that different jurors may be
influenced by possible life experience views on the issue of prior convictions and
identity disclosure in terms of community placement. Most participants assigned to
the group receiving knowledge that the offender had ‘no similar prior convictions’
indicated that the identity either should not be disclosed, or they could not decide.
The explicit negation did not change their thinking, because their thoughts about
identity disclosure were the same before as after disclosure. Participants in the group
that received knowledge that the offender had ‘a similar prior conviction’ presented
more responses favourable to disclosure before and more so after disclosure (see also
Pratto & John, 1991). Regarding identity disclosure, there may be subsets of the
population who are more conservative than we have previously been aware of (pace
West, 2000).
Encouragingly, respondents receiving information about a prior were aware that
the disclosure of a prior conviction impacted on their ratings. Knowing that such
evidence affects their thinking supports the notion of trusting the evidence to lay fact
finders (i.e. Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales, HMSO, 2001), but
knowing that is different to knowing how. Consider the jurors who decided that
David Baxter was guilty given the evidence of left-handedness and a similar prior
conviction in study 2. They would know that the prior conviction would affect their
responses, but not know how it may have become a lens by which they evaluated the
remaining evidence in the evidence set. Thus they accorded left-handedness more
importance than their counterparts who received evidence of left-handedness alone,
and their ability to generate alternative possibilities indicative of guilt was
suppressed.
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It is possible that reasoning about similar priors from a juror’s individual
perspective may suppress the consideration of alternatives by which evidence may be
evaluated (see London & Nunez, 2000). A group deliberation process may succeed in
prompting alternative possibilities consistent with innocence and guilt simulta-
neously (e.g. Carretta & Moreland, 1983), and indeed the collective reasoning
process may expand cognitive resources to deal with many alternative explanations,
or what discourse based theories have termed stories explaining the evidence
(Pennington & Hastie, 1986). Future studies have been planned using these materials
in conjunction with a larger set of evidence. For example, studies including refuting
evidence, and examining reasoning within group contexts, will provide additional
enriched analysis of these asymmetries in light of the new inclusive law provisions.
Legal implications
The results begin to demonstrate that there are difficulties in making assumptions
about a similar prior conviction having a uniform probative force across dissimilar
evidence contexts (Criminal Justice Act, 2003). Substantial probative value may not
be easily quantified by the court because the disclosure may prompt a mental
representation of guilt rather than an evidence value of guilt. Thus it may be difficult
to assume that a similar prior will be used independently as added propensity, given
that its association with guilt may diffuse to other evidence which only mildly
corroborates a guilty verdict.
Under the present proscriptions (Section 100(3)) the result highlights a somewhat
inconsistent logic in which a prior conviction is not to be introduced to trial
proceedings to strengthen a weak case (see Roberts & Zuckerman, 2004 for a review).
Yet when a case is considered to be strong, what then would the need be to include
the prior conviction? In particular we need to know more about the explicit
conditions under which the evidence is strong, but for which a similar prior
conviction would then become useful. For example, if a defendant’s character has
been attacked, would the defamer’s similar prior conviction for defamation add
useful probative value? Would access to similar prior convictions be better used to
eliminate the number of suspects in the investigative stages of a crime, than to
contribute to a case at trial? Even with the new provisions allowing similar prior
inclusion, a backfire effect could result in the appeals process, with prior conviction
inclusion providing a ready hook on which the defence could claim an unsafe
conviction. Apart from prolonging the suffering of true victims, who may then feel
that hard fought justice may be overturned, there is also the danger that defendants
who have a similar prior conviction, but who may be innocent, will be more readily
prosecuted.
Perhaps there has been more emphasis in the consideration of the new law
provisions in terms of what jurors ought to do, while paying little attention to what
jurors actually do, when presented with similar prior convictions as evidence. We
need to gain an increasingly good understanding of the psychological bases of prior
conviction reasoning to evaluate the successfulness of these new inclusive provisions
appropriately.
To this end this paper has presented a detailed empirical analysis on prior
conviction reasoning, using the Mental Model theoretical analysis, which is at the
forefront of cognitive research. But there is still much we do not know about how
228 M. Cowley and J.B. Colyer
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
Ox
fo
rd
] 
At
: 
09
:1
5 
8 
Ju
ne
 2
01
0
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2339476 
priors impact on reasoning. We have applied a deductive framework to predict which
premises are prompted by jurors own expectations from their knowledge of those
who have priors. This framework has limitations because it is most often used within
the constraints of simple propositional logic tasks (Johnson-Laird, 2006). With
increasing amounts of evidence in complex cases, and explanations about how jurors
deal with many propositions within an evidence set, a better understanding of the
switch between deductive and inductive processing will be needed (see also Cowley &
Byrne, in press; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988).
In sum, it is challenging to evaluate law changes from a psychological perspective,
because there is presently no complete theory of how the juror mind mentally
represents evidence in a complex trial. That we are beginning to shed some light on
how priors may prompt models of guilt rather than guilt values is a significant step
not only to such a legal theory’s development, but to the debate on the horizon
between reasoning theories that place predominant importance on evidence values
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007) versus those who give primary place to mental models of
evidence (Johnson-Laird, 2006).
Notes
1. Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (HMSO, 2001).
2. The Law Commission report Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings (Law
Commission, No. 273, cm 5257, 2001)
3. The symbol  denotes negation, i.e. ‘not’.
4. An informal measure of inter-rater reliability was carried out by a non-psychologist (BL)
on a subset of the transcribed responses (5%) to ensure that the coding scheme
corresponded to the coding used in the analysis. There was a 90% correspondence rate.
5. The chi-squares for the pattern of explicit and non-explicit alternatives did not yield
statistically significant patterns because of the small number of alternatives generated in
this pilot study.
6. This case was based on a real-life conviction in which a child died. The child’s name was not
disclosed. Respondents were aware of their right to withdraw participation at any stage and
were given a verbal and written debriefing. Contact details for the supervising researcher
and relevant organizations were made available to all jurors.
7. Note that random sampling does not allow the study to control the initial attitudes people
have towards re-offending and within effects are appropriate. Attitudes were milder to start
out with in the condition in which disclosure of a prior conviction was allocated than for
the two remaining conditions making it essential to map the change within-subjects across
conditions.
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Appendix I. Examples of each sort of code in the content analysis coding scheme from Study 1.
Coder’s shorthand is in parentheses.
Evidence statements
It does point quite firmly in his direction ( E) {study 2, s13, c1, q2}
With present evidence he is ( E) {study 2, s24, c2, q1}
There is no evidence ( E) {study 2, s5, c1, q2}
There is insufficient evidence ( E) {study 2, s2, c1, q1}
I would say it is a neutral choice ( E) {study 2, s35, c3, q2}
Alternative possibilities
Any left-handed person could have killed Joanna (Alt ex) {study 2, s19, c2, q2}
Someone trying to frame him by delivering a blow with {study 2, s22, c2, q1}
his left hand (Alt ex)
Or not guilty (Alt ex) {study 2, s14, c2, q2}
Either way (Alt ex) {study 2, s17, c2, q1}
Motive
No motive ( intent) {study 2, s4, c1, q1}
Maybe it was an accident ( intent)
But maybe it wasn’t ( intent) {study 2, s10, c1, q1}
That he was jealous of the attention the baby got (intent) {study 2, s13, c1, q2}
Maybe a coincidence (co-in) {study 2, s15, c2, q2}
Unlikely it’s just a coincidence ( co-in) {study 2, s22, c2, q2}
Counter Evidence [( E)(AltexAltnonex)( intent)(co-in)]
Key: (), positive; (), negative; (), neutral; (Alt), alternative; (ex), explicit; (), not; (co-in),
coincidence. {s} subject; {c} condition; {q} question.
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